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Abstract 
 
One of the elements that obstruct the access to a presumed meaning of Plato’s 
doctrine is the use of the conventional meaning of the term “philosophia”, that 
is the signification that has prevailed after Aristotle. In order to eliminate 
this anachronism, it is necessary to review the meanings that the term had 
before Plato and in his dialogues. We should see that for the founder of the 
Academy philosophy was not a purely contemplative act, but one that was 
concerned with politics. In his opinion, philosophy as dialectics was the art of 
contentious reasoning, of continuous and everlasting validation of true 
opinions. This method does not lead to truth; it substitutes the truth – and all 
this happens in the field of language. Thus philosophy is also a way to govern 
and make politics. Ergo the expression “philosopher king” does not unite 
terms that were previously opposites, but rather expresses the need that this 
model of making politics takes the place of the already established political power. 
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Among the elements that are considered to place Plato’s 
texts in a dark area, we could mention the following: the long 
period of time elapsed since their writing, the intermediate 
means by which we access them, philosophical culture, and our 
intentions and prejudices in our approaches. To all these, we 
could also add some aspects that are only specific to Plato's 
writings, such as the dialogue-based manner in which the phi-
losopher wrote his work and the criticism to which he submit-
ted some projections that seemed to shape his doctrine. Most 
interpreters also talk about the dual personality of the philoso-
pher, encountering great difficulties in understanding how a 
philosopher so pure, a “metaphysician par excellence”, who ad-
vocated withdrawal from this world in order to access the world 
of ideas, could be interested in politics. To “save” him from a 
possible condemnation in the style of Karl Popper, they settle 
the matter quickly by citing the “complex personality” of the 
founder of the Academy.  META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (1) / 2009 
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In this study I will focus on this last issue starting from 
the idea that the aspect which casts the greatest shadow over 
an alleged sense of Plato’s work is mainly related to philosophi-
cal culture. I am not referring to a term that has supposedly 
been considered minor until now and that would prove to be the 
key to the message of Plato's writings, but to the sense of one 
term which is usually considered to be quite clear, i.e. the 
meaning that the word philosophia  itself received after 
Aristotle and that stood at the basis of Platonism. Therefore I 
consider it necessary for the approach to Plato’s philosophy to 
be preceded and thus made possible by a passage through the 
meanings that philosophy itself had before the first great 
Platonist, Aristotle.  
A well known commentator of Platonic philosophy, 
Auguste Diès, claimed that Plato “is eminently a political 
thinker who, in fact, entered philosophy only by politics and for 
politics and if philosophy and politics are sometimes differenti-
ated and separated in his work, we should ask ourselves how, 
when, and for how long this happens. At its origins, in Plato, 
philosophy was nothing else but hindered action that was kept 
in reserve only to come about more safely” (Diès 1932, V). It is 
convenient to notice that Diès operates with the distinction 
philosophy-politics in the post-Aristotelian sense, thus making 
an anachronism. In the pre-Aristotelian Greek society, to make 
philosophy was to make a political gesture. Operating with the 
ancient meaning of philosophy, the “entry” in philosophy men-
tioned by Diès no longer appears as a shift from one gender to 
another, but as an option for another type of civic or political 
action, especially for a philosopher who explicitly supported the 
meeting of the philosopher and statesman in the same man (the 
philosopher-king) and that of philosophy and political art in the 
same method (dialectics).  
In all the directions of interpretation of Plato’s work1, we 
find the same practice of judging the philosopher in the terms of 
the post-Aristotelian canon. This pattern is even more clear at 
traditionalists, who see Plato as a contemplative man, concerned 
exclusively with epistemological, ontological and metaphysical 
problems. Declaring himself a follower of that direction, Valentin 
Mureşan states: "I think, along with the traditionalists of the Sorin Bocancea / Plato: Philosophy as Politics 
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nineteenth century, that the Platonic dialogues propose philo-
sophical theories and that they are not just skillfully articulated 
vehicles for the spread of thoughts about life, sometimes hidden 
by a deliberately misleading language, introduced for political 
reasons or simply, by conformity. If it were not so, we would be 
compelled to lower too much this archetypal philosopher in the 
area of the derisory daily life of the city” (Mureşan 2000, 35).  
  A supporter of the dialogue-dramatic interpretation, 
Andrei Cornea considers that the origin of this mode of inter-
pretation could be located in Plato himself, since he imposed 
the idea of philosophy as a heuristic approach (idea that has 
become conventional) and not as a justifying one: “As long as we 
are still influenced, even in a subtle way, by a form of 
Platonism, the ‘conventional’ interpretation appears in the 
natural order of things and cannot be avoided”. Those who 
interpreted Plato in terms of the conventional understanding of 
philosophy “were, somehow, Platonized even if they were not 
Platonists, and the first and most famous of them was none 
other than Aristotle” (Cornea 1995, 35-6).  
 Given that the traditionalist interpretation aims at re-
constructing Plato’s reasoning and not at glossing on certain 
issues, it sins by anachronism, since it starts from the Aristote-
lian idea of a net separation between epistéme and phrónesis (at 
least ambiguous, if not nonexistent, in Plato) and from the 
thought that by separating forms from things, Plato would have 
been concerned only with the former and would have repudi-
ated concrete reality, as Platonists would actually do later on. 
Aristotle is the one who shared such an idea, in his Metaphysics 
(1078 b): “There are just two things one might fairly ascribe to 
Socrates, arguments from particular to general and general 
definitions, borh being concerned with the starting-point of 
knowledge. Well, Socrates did not take the universals to be 
separate, nor the definitions, but they [the Platonists] made 
them separate, and called such entities Forms” [or Ideas] 
(Aristotle 1976, 97).  
I think that if we refrained ourselves from judging the 
theory of Ideas from Aristotle’s point of view, we would discover 
that Plato was not so "contemplative" (attitude that he himself 
ridiculed) and that his philosophical projections, including the 
theory of ideas, are creations with a practical purpose. META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (1) / 2009 
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According to Gabriel Liiceanu, while analyzing the study of 
Endre Ivánka about the Fathers’ undertaking and reformu-
lating Platonism, Constantin Noica made the following notes, 
that I fully endorse: “My only reproach to the author is that by 
introducing Plato in the first chapter, he understands him in 
the same way that he was later transformed by the Fathers of 
the Church: in line with that chorismós, the clear cut line of 
demarcation between ideal and real that was nonexistent in 
Plato and that Aristotle introduced into the understanding of 
Platonism. In Plato, Plato's ideas did not exist in the ekei area, 
a distant area clearly separated from ‘here’.” (Liiceanu 2005, 
92) 
At the beginning of the fourth decade of the last century, 
A. Lovejoy indicated that there are two major currents in the 
Platonic tradition, one that focuses on the transmundane 
understood as a “belief that both the genuinely 'real' and the 
truly good are radically antithetic in their essential 
characteristics to anything to be found in man's natural life, in 
the ordinary course of human experience, however normal, 
however intelligent, and however fortunate” (Lovejoy 1997, 26-
7); another current centered on the mundane is, in its extreme 
form, the belief in the joys offered by the next life, seen as 
similar to this one, but without the trivial or painful matters. It 
seems that the former current was stronger, Plato being known 
as the father of the transmundane (along with Parmenides, of 
course, thought to be its “great-grandfather”).  
Such a use of the term “philosophy” throws the entire 
Platonic structure in an obscure area paradoxically generated 
by a term that seems quite clear. Therefore, I think that in 
order to overcome the difficulties arising from such an interpre-
tation, it is necessary to reflect on a brief overview of the 
meanings that the term philosophia had until Plato, of the 
meanings brought to it by Plato himself (since there is the risk 
to expect from the philosopher what he could not give us) and, 
finally, to see what kind of philosopher we are dealing with in 
the Platonic work.  
 
 
 Sorin Bocancea / Plato: Philosophy as Politics 
  159 
 
1. The Philosophy of Greeks 
 
In one of his famous studies, Pierre Hadot makes an elo-
quent presentation of the meanings that philosophy had in an-
cient Greece. He begins with the well known story that 
Croesus, the king of Lydia, thought that Solon was wise owing 
to the journeys he had made in order to acquire knowledge and 
gain experience in reality and people: “Presocratics apparently 
designated their intellectual undertaking as a historia – that is, 
an inquiry” (Hadot 2002, 16). Solon employed the word sophia 
to describe poetic activity, and thus the term came to designate 
the virtues of discourse and the art of conversation including 
even shrewdness and dissimulation. In his famous funeral 
speech, Pericles praised the Athenians because they loved 
beauty and made philosophy relentlessly - all those who loved 
beauty were devoted to the love of sophia. In addition to these 
meanings, philosophy also designated science (the concerns of 
the Milesians and of those who followed them in the research 
on nature).  
With Socrates, philosophy began to designate the research 
of one’s soul. The philosopher’s questions no longer aimed at 
leading his audience to the truth of things or making them 
acquire a skill, but rather at making them aware of their limits 
and of the need to extract knowledge from themselves. “In the 
Socratic dialogue, the real question is less what is being talked 
about than who is doing the talking. This is made explicit [in 
Laches – S.B.] by Nicias, one of Plato's character” (Hadot 2002, 
28). With Socrates, there was a leap from the acquisition of 
practical skills of knowledge. But we must be very careful with 
the term employed to designate this knowledge. Hadot 
judiciously observed that, in Socrates, “knowledge is not a 
series of propositions or an abstract theory, but the certainty of 
choice, decision, and initiative. Knowledge is not just plain 
knowing, but knowing-what-ought-to-be-preferred, and hence 
knowing how to live. [...] This knowledge of value is taken from 
Socrates' inner experience - the experience of a choice which 
implicates him entirely. [...] The philosopher's entire role will 
therefore consist in permitting his interlocutor to 'realize', in META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (1) / 2009 
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the strongest sense of the word, what the true good is and what 
true value is. At the basis of Socratic knowledge is love of the 
good” (Hadot 2002, 33-4)2. 
The philosopher is someone who will always seek knowl-
edge without ever reaching it. He stands in the gap between 
knowledge and ignorance, and he always reaches out to know-
ledge. Here is what F.M. Cornford in his commentary to The 
Republic  of Plato said: “Socratic philosophy, analyzed and 
expressed in the early dialogues, was neither a study of nature, 
nor logic or metaphysics; it was the pursuit of wisdom and to 
acquire wisdom meant to acquire human perfection, fulfillment, 
happiness. But this did not mean ‘to look only after your soul’ 
as an isolated individual, saving only yourself and leaving 
society to its fate. Human perfection, as Plato and Aristotle 
claimed after him, was the perfection of an essentially social 
creature, the citizen. To accomplish this perfection and the 
fulfillment that arose from it – that was the real goal of the 
‘royal art’, that is political leadership. Therefore, as Callicles 
thought, a life dedicated to philosophy and political activities 
must not be understood as two parallel careers, but one life – in 
which the highest human capacities would reach their full 
expression” (Mureşan 2000, 44). However, I believe that these 
considerations are more prevalent in Plato's philosophy than in 
that of Socrates. Indeed, as any other Greek, Socrates was 
concerned with the citizen but in his philosophy, the political 
component was less obvious than in Plato’s.  
In a study about virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre observed 
that although there were actually several different senses of 
virtue in Greece, according to the age in which the term was 
employed, they all had one common point: “The common 
Athenian assumption then is that the vinues have their place 
within the social context of the city-state. To be a good man will 
on every Greek view be at least closely allied to being a good 
citizen” (MacIntyre 2001, 135). Moreover, I think it was all the 
same. The individual secluded in his private area where, 
sheltered by his right to be left alone, he can pass through 
various trials, including that of the desert, is a character that 
has become mature only during the modern era. As shown by A. Sorin Bocancea / Plato: Philosophy as Politics 
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Cornea, “philosophy was never disinterested contemplation, 
and it did not have to wait for Marx to learn to stop the wheel of 
history and change its course” (Cornea 1995, 31). 
MacIntyre considers the relationship between philoso-
phy and politics within the framework of a more comprehensive 
term of the ancient Greek: agon (competition, contest). In 
ancient Greece, the agon was an institution because it reunited 
Greeks from different city-states and it also built the internal 
cohesion of each city. It assumed various forms, from debates in 
courts to philosophical dialogues. In this context, politics, thea-
ter and philosophy were closely related categories: “At Athens 
the audience for each was potentially largely and actually to 
some degree one and the same; and the audience itself was a 
collective actor. The producer of drama was a holder of political 
office; the philosopher risked comic portrayal and political 
punishment. The Athenians had not insulated, as we have by a 
set of institutional devices, the pursuit of political ends from 
dramatic representation or the asking of philosophical 
questions from either. Hence we lack, as they did not, any 
public, generally shared communal mode either for 
representing political conflict or for putting our politics to the 
philosophical question” (MacIntyre 2001, 138). Indeed, Plato's 
philosophy questions politics that seems to be a form of virtue 
management.   
Jan Patočka (Platon et l'Europe) said that Plato set the 
basis of the “great philosophical project of a State of justice 
where people like Socrates could live, and where they would no 
longer necessarily need to die.” It is a city where people would 
live according to Socrates’ model, that is “showing concern for 
one’s soul and achieving the philosophical idea that asserts that 
one should live and think only by looking at what it exists” 
(Maci 2006, 205). This enterprise involves a project regarding 
the truth, one regarding the community and an examination of 
the human soul (Maci 2006, 208). The interrogative, 
challenging placing of the soul between the everyday world and 
that of unity requires attention, availability, accountability and 
discernment, as well as individual and civic virtues. The 
concern for one’s soul is expressed at the crossroads of the three META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (1) / 2009 
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directions; it is “the ideal of the philosophy of life lived in truth” 
(Maci 2006, 210). 
Drawing attention on the practical dimension, which he 
considers to be the cause of the theoretical act, Hadot argues 
that “at least since the time of Socrates, the choice of a way of 
life has not been located at the end of the process of 
philosophical activity, like a kind of accessory or appendix. On 
the contrary, it stands at the beginning, in a complex 
interrelation with critical reaction to other existential attitudes, 
with global vision of a certain way of living and of seeing the 
world, and with voluntary decision itself” (Hadot 2002, 3). 
Theory does not have any origin or end in itself, but in the 
existential challenges of everyday life. It is therefore 
inappropriate to abstract from the concreteness of his life, the 
disciple of someone who brought philosophy from the sky into 
the city, transforming it into a way of life closely connected to 
philosophical discourse.  
 
2. Philosophy in Plato 
 
If Socrates’ philosophy was political by default, to the 
extent that it aimed at educating the citizen, in Plato, this com-
ponent becomes the purpose of the philosophical approach and 
gains substance in a program, the founder of the Academy 
explicitly stating the need to identify philosophy with political 
power: “Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now 
called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately 
philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy 
entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present 
pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing 
so, cities will have no rest from evils, [...] nor, I think, will the 
human race” – Republic, 473 d-e (Plato 1997, 1100). This 
statement is not evidence that Plato saw philosophy as a 
distinct or even opposite occupation to politics, because what he 
wanted was not to identify politics with philosophy, but political 
power with philosophy. Philosophy was a way to do politics but 
had no power, a fact that did not exclude it from the political 
sphere. When Plato says that the ideal situation would be for 
the philosopher to be king this does not mean that up to that Sorin Bocancea / Plato: Philosophy as Politics 
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moment the philosopher was not involved in politics or that 
politics was only the prerogative of the king. Therefore it is 
necessary for the distinction between philosophy and political 
power not to be read as an opposition between philosophy and 
politics since Plato does not see philosophy as opposed to 
politics, but as a way of doing politics in opposition to the   
political power of his time and he wants philosophy to attain 
power and to govern. It is an ideal that is true even today 
(when politics deals with a more clearly defined area) in the 
aspirations of the intellectual elites who are involved in politics 
in the structures of the civil society.  
It is known that even before Plato, philosophers were 
involved in politics and what was called philosophy also had 
this component. However, in Plato, the accession of philosophy 
to power, its conquest of the public space and its taking over the 
management of institutions appear as imperative. The subject 
of the Politeia dialogue is not the mere knowledge of Good or 
the manner in which one can attain the knowledge of justice, as 
it has been said (Mureşan 2000, 50-1), but the achievement of 
justice, an act that is both philosophical and political.  
It is clear that in Plato, we are dealing with the speech 
of a school founder inspired by Pythagorean discourses. Phi-
losophy is the road to a truth that each man carries out with 
the other, his interlocutor in the dialogue. But it must be sepa-
rated from heuristics, the dispute for the sake of the dispute, 
since its purpose is not to win a fight at all costs, but the 
journey on the path of reason. Each of those participating to the 
dialogue will be moved and trained in a more Socratic effort. 
“[The] Platonic dialectics was not a purely logical exercise. 
Instead, it was a spiritual exercise which demanded that the 
interlocutors undergo an askēsis, or self-trans formation” 
(Hadot 2002, 62). As Plato tells us in the Seventh Letter (340 e), 
the orderly mode of daily life is that which befits the subject.  
In the perception of Platonism, I do not consider as 
appropriate the distinction made by one of Plato’s opponents, 
Isocrates (Exchange, § 271), between wisdom, the skill of 
making good decisions, and philosophy, seen as meditation in 
order to obtain the state of mind necessary for reasoning, 
because philosophy involves both dimensions, the slow META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (1) / 2009 
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education of character, that is a way of life. Like Bréhier said: 
“the nobility of an old Athenian and the subtlety of a sophist – 
here is what philosophical nature should encompass” (Bréhier 
1926, 151). 
In his early dialogues, Plato addresses those who, by 
their occupations, contributed in a more or less harmful way to 
the carrying out of public affairs, making his entrance on stage 
as an alternative to those old “masters of truth”, to use 
Detienne’s formula (Detienne 1996). In his dialogues of 
maturity, he articulates his symbolic offer whose sole condition 
of achievement is precisely to identify philosophy with politics, 
and the image of the “philosopher-king” is significant in this 
respect. The project was completed in his last dialogues, where 
political art was separated from others that existed in the sphere 
of power (they would become “auxiliary arts”), and it was 
nothing but dialectics.  
While accepting that the purpose of the Platonic 
endeavor is a political one, V. Mureşan considers that there is a 
clear difference between the methods of Plato and Aristotle; it 
would prove that, unlike the Stagirite, Plato gives a metaphysi-
cal answer to the political challenge: “I can accept that Plato's 
ultimate intention is a political one (“what form of political 
association would be the best”, as Aristotle says), but it is also 
clear that the methods used by the two are completely different: 
Plato develops the theme of the ideal city within the frame of 
what Aristotle would call epistéme (science) or sophia (specula-
tive wisdom), a definite knowledge of what is necessary, as his 
purpose is to discover the Form of the just city, while Aristotle 
placed his ethical-political discourse in the sphere of practical 
wisdom (phrónesis), which is contentious knowledge about the 
contingent of actions. Plato responds to political challenges in a 
different manner than Aristotle: not by proposing a specific 
political agenda, even a “mad” one, but by simulating how the 
statesman-metaphysician has to clear up, by “twisting” his 
spirit, the true nature of the just city. Therefore, the Republic 
seems to me a metaphysical dialogue, above all other things” 
(Mureşan 2000, 235-6). 
I think the interpreter overlooks the fact that Plato did 
not make science in the same manner as Aristotle. For him, the Sorin Bocancea / Plato: Philosophy as Politics 
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distinction between epistéme and phrónesis was not so radical 
as it would appear in the Stagirite. In Plato, to distinguish does 
not mean to separate. We will understand more about this issue 
if we stop to take a look at dialectics, which he considered to be 
both knowledge and an instrument of government.  
If for the sophists, dialectics meant the possibility to 
speak generally about all things, to the art of opinion that is 
different from science, from the ability to speak as a specialist 
about a limited field, Plato wants to give the weight of a sci-
ence, without losing the possibility of the whole. Here is what 
Aubenque said: “For Plato, dialectics is not what it was in 
Socrates’ mind: the knowledge of ignorance is even less than 
what rhetoric was to Gorgias: the substitute of competence. 
Plato is the only philosopher for whom dialectics is not opposed 
to science; the orators’ technique of persuasion, a critical tool in 
Socrates is opposed to the competence of cultivated people; this 
is a view shared by Aristotle himself later on; a kind of general 
knowledge, that has opinion as its subject and the probable as 
its purpose, dialectics is opposed to the science of work. Plato 
believed that he could overcome this dissociation: for him, the 
dialectician is not so different from the scientist, as he is a man 
of supreme competence; dialectics is not so different from sci-
ence, as it is ‘the climax and the crown of all sciences’” 
(Aubenque 2002, 277). 
  Plato's dialectics does not abandon all previous earnings; 
however, it takes its distance from two elements: the anti-spe-
cialization supported by Gorgias and the irony regarding 
specialization practiced by Socrates, because it does not want to 
miss either universality or accuracy. It also preserves the rhe-
torical element - what else is the new art of the Muses proposed 
by Plato than a rhetorical cover appropriate for dialectics in its 
new content? A new rhetoric was necessary for the new mission 
of dialectics.  
  Setting Good as its object, Plato wants to give dialectics 
both universality and knowledge. Dialectics will develop both, 
because it does not have them yet, being the science of the prin-
ciple of things without having the principle as a given fact. It 
remains unknown. Deduction is not sufficient for the truth, it META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (1) / 2009 
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always needs a practical confirmation in the useful and beauti-
ful. Therefore, dialectics is not a purely theoretical science.  
  As Aristotle tells us in Topics (100 a), dialectics is the 
art of contentious reasoning. Dialectics is not about demonstra-
tion: “A deduction, then, is an argument in which, certain 
things being supposed, something different from the 
suppositions results of necessity through them. It is a 
demonstration if the deduction is from things which either are 
themselves true and primary or have attained the starting-
point of knowledge about themselves through some primary 
and true premisses. A dialectical deduction, on the other hand, 
is one which deduces from what is acceptable” (Aristotle 2003, 
1).  
Even if Plato's dialectics claimed to be a science (which 
Plato labeled as ‘infallible’, but only in relation to opinion [Rep., 
477e]), it did not offer us demonstrations, but also contentious 
reasoning. It does not express essences, principles, but leads us 
to principles. As Aristotle (101 a-b) tells us, dialectics helps us 
assess the principles of all sciences: “it is impossible to make 
any statement about these (since these starting-points are the 
first of them all), and it is by means of what is acceptable about 
each that it is necessary to discuss them. But this is unique, or 
at any rate most appropriate, to dialectic: for since its ability to 
examine applies to the starting-points of all studies, it has a 
way to proceed” (Aristotle 2003, 2-3). 
In Plato things were not very different. In Meno, dialec-
tics starts from the right opinion expressed by a wise man and, 
by linking different causes, produces a truth which would be 
confirmed by beauty and utility. Sophists and Socrates also 
took into account this starting point, to which they added the 
opinion of the crowd. Aristotle tells us (100 b) that contentious 
arguments that lie at the basis of dialectical reasoning are 
those “which seem [acceptable] to everyone, or to most people, 
or to the wise - to all of them, or to most, or to most famous and 
esteemed” (Aristotle 2003, 3). 
In  Posterior Analytics (91b-92a), the Stagirite distin-
guishes between science and dialectics, arguing that the latter 
proceeds through questions. The entire dialectical approach 
should not be confused with a syllogism: “Nevertheless, there is Sorin Bocancea / Plato: Philosophy as Politics 
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no deduction here; rather, the procedure lets us get to know 
what the thing is in some other way (if at all). [...] If you state 
the definition on the basis of the division, you do not give a 
deduction. In the case of conclusions without middle terms, if 
someone says that if these items are the case then it is 
necessary for this to be the case, it is possible to ask why: so too 
in the case of divisional definitions” (Aristotle 1993, 53). 
Although the dialectical approach can lead us to a definition, it 
is a provisional one, since the conclusion is obtained without 
the appropriate middle terms able to show the need to connect 
attributes.  
Plato noticed the fact that dialectics means placing the 
right opinion in causal chains, but division failed to meet this 
requirement: the simple listing of attributes, that can provide 
the elements of a demonstration, does not contain the need to 
connect them in a certain way and not otherwise, like demon-
stration is supposed to do. So, the fact that Plato considered 
dialectics a science does not mean that this method did not 
preserve the characteristics of an art of contentious reasoning 
to him. When we talk about science in Plato, it is necessary not 
to operate with the Aristotelian content of the term, but to 
remain in these Platonic frameworks.  
Aubenque identifies two types of dialectics in Aristotle: a 
provisional or pre-scientific one, aimed at “seizing and defining 
an essence which, serving as the principle of a demonstration, 
will start a type of independent knowledge before the dialectical 
conditions of its establishment” (case of induction), and “true 
dialectics”, the one that “does not reach any essence, any 
nature, but nevertheless proves to be strong enough ‘to take 
into account the opposites’ without the help of the essence”, 
that dialectics that “no longer steps away from analytics but 
replaces it to fill its gaps: the constancy of dialogue itself 
becomes the human substitute of a meditation that cannot be 
found in things. The word becomes once again, as it was for 
sophists and orators, the inevitable substitute of knowledge” 
(Aubenque 2002, 294-5). The French commentator considers 
this latter form of dialectics to be “Aristotle's original 
contribution in terms of dialectics”.  META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (1) / 2009 
  168 
But, this view would be supported if we ignored the 
Cratylus, Theaetetus and Sophist dialogues where Plato 
describes how meaning is constituted dialectically, through 
words, being the substitute of truth. Dialectics also has the 
former meaning, just as it claims to seize a principle, like in the 
first meaning. I consider Parain’s remark to be revealing: 
“between the world of ideas and the sensible world, that are 
impossible to separate in an absolute manner without destroy-
ing everything, he [Plato – S.B.] will introduce language with 
an intermediary role, as a mediator, it should be said, that he 
will define it as a genre of being. If language was not a genre of 
being, we could not say about anything that it exists. This new 
view, which is not separated from Plato's earlier thinking but, 
on the contrary, is perfected in the field of logic, results from his 
entire dialectical activity. In this case, the nature of being was 
not considered in itself, directly or through mystical insight, but 
through the meanings of the word being and its uses” (Parain 
1998, 113). Plato’s dialectics also has the characteristics of the 
provisional one, as it claims to seize a principle (which, in fact, 
it sets up itself) and, at the same time, it replaces knowledge 
establishing the meanings of words that draw out of themselves 
both the Being and the sensible world. Through dialectics, we 
determine the two worlds, and the whole process takes place at 
the level of language.  
Aristotle’ reading of Plato made an entire tradition 
believe that in Plato, dialectics arrives at the knowledge of 
principles. But, we will see that it is a substitute for knowledge, 
a pre-science or a proto-science with the claims of a science, if 
we are to relate to science in the sense it acquired from 
Aristotle. It will not find the middle term in theory, but by 
resorting to the useful and beautiful. We do not have a pure 
science, which develops a priori, but one in a perpetual configu-
ration at the level of language (where there is also a dose of 
convention), which always uses elements that do not fall within 
the theoretical framework and therefore are always relative.  
I think it is wrong to believe that from Plato to Aristotle, 
dialectics passed from “the status of a science to that of simple 
logic of the plausible”, a path that might seem like a degrada-
tion, because in Plato, science, which is dialectics, develops only Sorin Bocancea / Plato: Philosophy as Politics 
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as the logic of the plausible. Plato did not commit the sin to 
think science otherwise than in the logic of the plausible. The 
fact that in Aristotle, it appears as the simple logic of the plau-
sible is true. His text reads: “For sophistry and dialectic are 
concerned with the same class of subjects as philosophy, but 
philosophy differs from the former in the nature of its capability 
and from the latter in its outlook on life. Dialectic treats as an 
exercise what philosophy tries to understand, and sophistry 
seems to be philosophy; but is not” (Metaphysics, 1004 b). 
Plato’s dialectics is such a guess, it is the only thing it can do as 
a science. Therefore, in my opinion, Aubenque’s comment on the 
Aristotelian text seems to be true for Plato’s dialectics “what 
will draw dialectics nearer to philosophy is not only the identity 
of their subjects, but also the identity of their approaches: the 
dialectical moment of searching and testing is no longer remote 
from its outcome; to resume the Aristotelian distinction, the 
philosophy of being is not a collection of data in a field, but of 
issues. The always "wanted" science, the science of being as 
being is such that the dialectical training for knowledge 
becomes the substitute of knowledge itself” (Aubenque 2002, 
300). In Plato, truth is the method.  
Why does Plato stop to consider this guessing a science? 
Because its purpose is not to give us knowledge in one area, but 
to prepare us for any knowledge. Dialectics makes us human, 
beings whose main characteristic is to reason. This is enough. 
We cannot understand Plato’s dialectics if we consider it 
outside its anthropological stake kept by the sophists. It is the 
one that helps us understand ourselves by problem-raising. As 
Aubenque puts it, “dialectics provides a universal technique of 
questioning, without being concerned by the humans’ potential 
to respond; but man would not ask questions if he did not hope 
to answer them” (Aubenque 2002, 301).  
Dialectics is Plato’s science and it shows us that there 
are opposites in each thing. The best way to perceive Platonic 
thought is dialectics itself, which will show us that philosophy 
in the manner proposed by Plato did not refer to a type of 
asceticism, as it can be read in Metaphysics o r  i n  a  p a s s a g e  
extracted from its context from the Book X of Nicomachean 
Ethics3. Although there are a few places in Plato’s texts where META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (1) / 2009 
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the philosopher appears as being the one who knows the Ideas, 
“the things themselves that are always the same in every 
respect” – Republic  479e (Plato 1997, 1107), we must not 
interpret these passages outside their context. Knowledge is the 
connection in a causal chain of what is supposed to become 
knowledge and not revelation. Let us not forget that a condition 
of the truth of a piece of knowledge is its possibility to be 
transmitted. Plato wants to break from the religious practices 
of the mysteries of all kind and to establish knowledge as a 
product of a rational and methodical approach. It is, as he says 
in Timaeus (51 e), the science that only belongs to “the gods and 
but a small class of men”, which “arises in us by teaching..., is 
always in company with true reasoning... is immovable by 
persuasion”. But, this science, which is dialectics for Plato, fails 
to give any certainty; the knowledge of Ideas that it postulates 
or that makes it possible leads us to paradoxes, a fact proven in 
the dialectical dialogues. Therefore, Plato’s philosopher is not 
an expert, but a lover of knowledge, as this label also 
recommends him.    
As an example of access to the world of Ideas we could 
note the Platonic approach itself in the Republic, where we are 
presented the idea of justice. We do not have a definition that 
leaves no room for probability, but one that needs representa-
tions such as the man and the just city, with all the imperfec-
tions that such projections require. To this example, we could 
add Parmenides’ henology.  
Dialectics made possible for both the discourse regarding 
the city in the Republic and the one in Laws to be practical, 
even if, considering it from the Aristotelian canon, the former 
seems to be predominantly theoretical. None of the perspectives 
eliminates the other, because in Plato, there is no clear distinc-
tion between human happiness and that of the city; it is not 
about two realities, but only about one: the man, for whom 
political action is one of self-acknowledgement. In Aristotle, we 
have a different situation: he devotes a treaty to individual 
happiness (Nicomachean Ethics) and one to that of the city 
(Politics, IV, chap. 1-2), because, in his view, there is a distinc-
tion between the happiness gained in working life and that 
earned in contemplative life, a distinction between politics and Sorin Bocancea / Plato: Philosophy as Politics 
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philosophy. In spite of all this, in Nicomachean Ethics he says: 
In spite of all this, in Nicomachean Ethics (1094 a) he says: 
“Knowledge of the good would seem to be the concern of the 
most authoritative science, the highest master science. And this 
is obviously the science of politics” (Aristotle 2004, 4). Working 
with the distinctions that we make today can lead us away from 
the meanings we seek. I retain, in this respect, one of 
Aubenque’s observations: “the opposition between ontology and 
theology, like that between opinion and science, between 
rhetoric and ‘profession’, reproduces the opposition between 
democracy and aristocracy on another level. Should this 
convergence really surprise us? Should we be surprised by the 
fact that the prehistory of metaphysics leads us to a trap, a 
crossroads of issues in which politics, philosophy, reflection on 
the word and art give meaning to each other in a non-differen-
tiated complex? Should we be surprised by the fact that the 
project for a science of being as being, which seemed to be ab-
stract as soon as its human reverberations had been forgotten, 
originated and extracted its lifeblood from a debate focused on 
the condition and the vocation, inextricably theoretical, techni-
cal and political, of man as a man?” (Aubenque 2002, 280). 
Therefore, I think it is inadequate to judge Plato in the light of 
Aristotle's authority. As Whitehead suggested: “the idea of pure 
knowledge, or of pure understanding […] was completely 
foreign to Plato's thought. The age of the Professors had not yet 
come” (Hadot 2002, 70). 
 
3. Plato’s philosopher  
 
Those who argue that there is a clear distinction 
between philosopher and statesman in Plato, primarily point to 
the Statesman dialogue; Mihai Maga argues that “the determi-
nation of science or political art, be it by gradual dichotomous 
division or by analogy, no longer privileges the philosopher – a 
fact proved by both the absence of the term ‘philosopher’ from 
the structure of the dialogue and the initial indication, referring 
to another possible dialogue, dedicated to the philosopher that 
would complete a triptych sophist-statesman-philosopher. Should 
we understand that there is a contrary relationship between META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (1) / 2009 
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the statesman and the philosopher? [...] The distinction is made 
when science is divided into directive and critical science, into 
the action of guiding and that of judging” (Maga 2006, 191).  To 
this, we should add the distinction between the three at the 
beginning of the Sophist dialogue.  
Indeed, at the beginning of the Sophist dialogue, he 
speaks of the three (the sophist, the statesman and the philoso-
pher), but we must consider the context: Socrates tells 
Theodoros that a wise man as the Stranger of Elea is thought to 
be a philosopher and is seen by the crowd whether as a sophist, 
a statesman or as a madman (216c-d). Here Socrates expresses 
the perception of the crowd, because he continues: “Did they 
consider all these one, or two, or, as there are three names, did 
they divide them into three classes and ascribe a class, to each 
that corresponds to a single name?” The Stranger answers: “I 
have no objection, and it is not difficult to say that they 
considered them to be three” (217a-b). This is the theme: to 
decide whether the three names designate three distinct 
genres. The presentation of the three concerns should not be 
taken as truth, since they are opinions, statements under the 
sign of probability, that are to be proven true through 
dialectical exercise. And this exercise, carried out now not as a 
genealogy (like in the Republic) but as a dichotomy, will 
propose the same character as in the Republic: the statesman of 
the “scientific city”. Those from other forms of city are sophists, 
not statesmen (303c).  
To begin with, I think that Plato did not write the 
dialogue about the philosopher after all, because he did not 
have anything else to say about him after the Republic. And 
even if it was not so, we cannot say that the philosopher saw a 
clear distinction between the two characters, explaining this 
opinion only by the fact that he had announced an idea. 
Secondly, the dichotomy in Statesman should be considered con 
grano salis, because it is a dialectical exercise, thus situated 
under the sign of probability. There is no contradiction between 
the directive and the critical. The stranger asks himself: “Now 
to which of these two classes is the kingly man to be assigned? 
Shall we assign him to the art of judging, as a kind of spectator, Sorin Bocancea / Plato: Philosophy as Politics 
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or rather to the art of commanding, inasmuch as he is a ruler?” 
(260c). The directive part does not exclude the critical one. 
Division is not achieved by exclusive disjunctions; the two 
terms are species of the same genus. The statesman should be 
placed among “those who have a science” (258b).  
Traditionalist interpretation tends to bring out of Plato 
another human type that it acknowledges him to be: Mureşan 
asserts that “Plato was a person always drawn in two opposite 
directions, that he thought to be convergent: scientific and phi-
losophical reflection, and politics” (Mureşan 2000, 41). This is 
where the problem lies: if Plato thought for these two directions 
“to be convergent”, then we should consider that he started 
from his thoughts back then and not from what we think right 
now. In the dialogues, he argues that the only person 
empowered to make politics is the one who is concerned with 
philosophy; he avoided this separation and his conviction was 
not eccentric or “mad”, but it was based on the historical fact 
that most philosophers before him had been statesmen.  
Post-Aristotelian philosophical schools have reduced the 
concern called philosophia to a simple reflection regarding the 
problems related to the theory of knowledge, logic or physics. It 
was considered that, in the development of theoretical construc-
tions, it does not matter what the thinker actually is or does, as 
long as he assumes at least some of the ideas that he supports. 
Such meanings also left their mark on the interpretation of the 
philosophy of a thinker who openly declared his practical 
orientation more than once. It seems that Plato was not saved 
from non-dialectical understanding which he dismissed above 
all.  
First of all, Plato’s philosophy suggests an attitude, 
challenged in his age both by the ignorance disguised in the 
display of over abundant pieces of knowledge, specific to the 
sophists, and in the candid one of the uneducated crowd. Sig-
nificant for its understanding is also the ironic attitude of the 
philosopher regarding the model of the theoretician who, while 
looking at the stars, falls into a pit. We should not forget that 
Plato the philosopher was, above all, a citizen, each of his ap-
proaches being placed under the sign of his obligations and his 
political commitment4. META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (1) / 2009 
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Although the concern with philosophical problems 
requires some degree of abstention from certain everyday 
activities, this does not mean that it is an ascetic endeavor, a 
retreat from the world – such an attitude emerges only when 
Pyrrho the skeptic takes on the model proposed by Oriental 
gymnosophists such as Guthrie who warns us that “it is too 
easily supposed that the Greeks, in their entirety, believed in 
an ideal of knowledge for the sake of knowledge, apart from 
practical objectives, and that they despised the useful arts” 
(Guthrie 1999, 23). Practical achievements were just as 
admired as the understanding of the universe, the stages of 
material progress being celebrated by all thinkers.  
The “archetypal” philosopher of classical Antiquity is not 
an extramundane individual. It is not only unwise to lower him 
into everyday life, but also impossible, because he is already 
there. He undertakes an intra-world mission, and he is 
different from others in that he asks himself about his role in 
the city and teaches the others to do so, too. Operating with this 
meaning, we are able to come closer to the senses transmitted 
to us by the exemplary citizen who was the philosopher of 
classical antiquity.  
In a recent study, Mihai Maci states that, with Plato, 
the condition of the philosopher in relation to the city has 
moved; “if in the beginning he was a constituent part of it, 
having, among other things, the duties of an effective legislator, 
with Plato, the thinker is placed at the borders of the city, re-
flecting on its structure and condition” (Maci 2006, 212). I do 
not share this idea, because there are sufficient instances 
where Plato claims that the philosopher needs to be king or 
legislator. If we refer to Plato himself, we know that he did not 
linger at the borders of the city, but was involved in its affairs. 
In addition to the Syracusan political experiences, the training 
of future statesmen was also a political act. And I do not think 
that a philosopher who claimed that the political act belonged 
to paideia perceived it otherwise. As for regulation, it takes its 
most radical form in Plato. We must not reduce political 
involvement to the actual participation in the government of 
that age, especially – and I stress this – in the case of a philoso-
pher for whom politics was essentially an educational project.  Sorin Bocancea / Plato: Philosophy as Politics 
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More than once, thematic interpretations have reduced 
Plato’s philosophy to only certain issues. If Theaetetus, for 
example, was read in terms of the radical intellectualism it 
contains, we would think that here Plato is also pursuing a 
process of stigmatization of sensation (and its universe), and 
denies any cognitive valence. The portrait of the wise man in 
this dialogue could support such a representation, making us 
think of a gnoseological and therefore ethical, ideal person. The 
“freeman”, the one who thinks quietly, does not participate to 
the life of the city and refuses to submerge in the little things of 
this world: “it is in reality only his body that lives and sleeps in 
the city. His mind, having come to the conclusion that all these 
things are of little or no account, spurns them and pursues its 
winged way, as Pindar says, throughout the universe, 'in the 
deeps below the earth' and 'in the heights above the heaven'; 
geometrizing upon earth, measuring its surfaces, astronomizing 
in the heavens; tracking down by every path the entire nature 
of each whole among the things that are, and never 
condescending to what lies near at hand” – Theaetetus 173e-
174a (Plato 1997, 192-3). Aware of the transitory feature and 
wickedness of this world, the seeker of wisdom will want to 
escape from it (176b). But we must take into account the fact 
that this description of the philosopher is made at the 
beginning of old age, when Plato decided to make philosophy ‘at 
leisure’, a feeling that he abandoned during the final part of his 
life. We can satisfy ourselves with this if we rely on the 
recovery of corporality in Philebus. Also, if in Phaedo (68 a), 
Socrates said that what the philosopher seeks all his life is 
knowledge, that he believed to be gained only after death5, in 
the Seventh Letter, written about six years before his death, 
Plato explicitly reveals the ideal which he pursued since his 
youth, that of participating to the public life of the city.  
It seems that Plato was not visited by the Daimon that 
made Socrates refrain from the handling of city affairs 
(Apology, 31 d)6, as he was more interested in what he could do 
and acquire here than in what he should expect after death: 
philosophy does not prepare one for death, as Socrates believed, 
but for life. And the dialogue is presented as such a training. If 
philosophy or contemplation dominated his life, then these META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (1) / 2009 
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terms should not be understood with meanings proposed by the 
philosophical tradition, i.e. without their practical connotations.  
Certainly, both the traditionalist interpretation and the 
others that it argues with on this issue, will have enough evi-
dence to prove their correctness. But they capture only some 
aspects of Platonism, because the dialogues that they rely on 
belong to a whole formed by repeated attempts to provide 
answers to the challenges of diversity, through probation and 
the insertion of different variants of construction in the dia-
logue. In spite of everything, we do not have a single portrait of 
the philosopher, but several ones, according to Plato’s ages: in 
the dialogues of his youth he wants to define virtue, in Phaedo 
he asks himself about the immortality of the soul to find onto-
logical support for his political project, in the Republic  he 
governs, in Theaetetus he is quietly occupied with dialectics, 
and in Laws he acts like a priest. The entire evolution of the 
philosopher’s portrait is closely linked to Plato's personal 
experiences and expresses his intentions at certain times of 
his life.  
Referring to the use of inappropriate concepts in the 
interpretation of Plato's work, R.M. Hare notes: “It is far safer 
not to attribute to Plato any proposition which cannot be 
translated into Greek, the language in which he did his 
thinking. […] If his own words are unclear or ambiguous, the 
most we can do is to imagine that we have him with us, put to 
him questions in Greek, and then speculate as to how he might 
answer them in Greek. If this method is followed, it will be 
found that many of the distinctions on which, as modern 
philosophers, we rightly want to insist, pass him by” (Hare 
1996, 24). Of course, Hare’s proposal pushes to the extreme the 
idea of fidelity to Plato’ texts. We have here an acquisition of 
Schleiermacher’s idea (Schleiermacher 2001, 41-2) that we 
must stand on the same level with the author, both on the 
objective side (knowing the language in which he wrote) and on 
the subjective one (knowing his inner and outer life). But given 
the fact that, as recognized by the experts in ancient Greek and 
by translators, it is possible for today’s ancient Greek to be 
different from that of over two thousand years ago, I doubt it 
would be possible to make an interpretation that would not Sorin Bocancea / Plato: Philosophy as Politics 
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extend beyond the framework of the language in which the 
philosopher wrote. All we have left is to try to compensate for 
this deficiency by a more careful approach to the subjective 
side.  
To move beyond the distortions that a whole philosophi-
cal tradition has produced, a first step would be to bring Plato 
from the Pantheon back into the city, i.e. his humanization. 
Perhaps we would be closer to the essence of his thinking if we 
did not perceive it as a meditation in the intellectualist 
meaning of the term, without practical sources and outcomes, 
that is, if we relocated it where its creator conceived it and 
wanted it to be: in the city. This does not mean that we should 
consider Platonic metaphysics to be just a digression, a 
parenthesis of the Platonic construction. Metaphysics is an 
element that has its place in the Platonic project, just like the 
others.  
Plato could not be the philosopher described by the 
intellectualist tradition. In my opinion, it is more appropriate to 
adopt an approach that operates with the meaning that phi-
losophia had back then, that is involving its practical purpose. 
Before Plato, philosophia was not a concern separated from 
politics, and a brief overview of the pre-Platonic history of the 
term has proven it. From this perspective, the political concep-
tion no longer appears as a chapter of the philosopher’s work, 
but his entire philosophy appears to be a rather political work, 
with its obvious metaphysical load.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 Jacob Howland identified four directions: traditionalism (specific to the 
Anglo-Saxon area), deconstructivism  (in the French area: J. Derrida), neo-
traditionalism (M. Nussbaum) and the dialogue-dramatic approach 
(Heidegger, Gadamer, L. Strauss). See Methods of Interpreting Plato, 
conference held at the University of Bucharest in 1997 (Mureşan 2000, 33). 
2 Hadot also evokes A.-J. Voelke’s idea that “Socratic dialectics indissolubly 
unites the knowledge of good and the choice of good.” (Voelke 1973, 194).  
3 In Metaphysics, Aristotle says that “science which is desirable in itself and 
for the sake of knowledge is more nearly Wisdom than that which is desirable 
for its results” [982 a]. And in Nicomachean Ethics he makes a clear 
distinction between ethical virtue and dianoetics. Since ethical virtue 
conditions him socially, dianoetics remains the form in which man achieves 
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happiness. To contemplate, man does not need anything, and thus is 
independent. And in Nicomachean Ethics [1178 b] he makes a clear 
distinction between ethical virtue and dianoetics. Since ethical virtue 
conditions him socially, dianoetics remains the form in which man achieves 
happiness. To contemplate, man does not need anything, and thus is 
independent. “Happiness, then, extends as far as contemplation, and the more 
contemplation there is in one's life, the happier one is, not incidentally, but in 
virtue of the contemplation, since this is honourable in itself. Happiness, 
therefore, will be some form of contemplation” (Aristotle 2004, 198). In this 
form and out of its context, the fragment describes the philosopher who has 
been imagined by Western culture for over two thousand years. But Aristotle 
tells further on that „for human nature is not self-sufficient for contemplation, 
but the body must be healthy and provided with food and other care” 
(Aristotle 2004, 198). This is why he will claim that politics is the science with 
the highest authority. 
4 I use the term political with the extensive meaning it had in ancient times; 
it can also be include the reality designated today by such terms as civic or 
civism. 
5 “If they are altogether estranged from the body and desire to have their soul 
by itself, would it not be quite absurd for them to be afraid and resentful 
when this happens? If they did not gladly set out for a place, where, on 
arrival, they may hope to attain that for which they had yearned during their 
lifetime, that is, wisdom, and where they would be rid of the presence of that 
from which they are estranged?” (Plato 1997, 59). 
6 “This began when I was a child. It is a voice, and whenever it speaks it turns 
me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do 
anything. This is what has prevented me from taking part in public affairs, 
and I think it was quite right to prevent me” (Plato 1997, 29).  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Aristotle. 1976. Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books M and N, 
translated by Juila Annas. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Aristotle. 1993. Posterior Analytics. Clarendon Aristotle Series. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Aristotle. 2003. Topics: Books I and VIII, translated with a 
commentary by Robin Smith. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Aristotle. 2004. Nicomachean Ethics, translated and edited by 
Roger Crisip, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 Sorin Bocancea / Plato: Philosophy as Politics 
  179 
 
 
Aubenque, Pierre. 2002. Le problème de l'être chez Aristote. 
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.  
Bréhier, Emile. 1926. Histoire de la philosophie, Tome premier, 
L’antiquité et le Moyen Age, I: Introduction – période hellénique. 
Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 
Cornea, Andrei. 1995. Platon. Filozofie şi cenzură [ Plato. 
Philosophy and censorship]. Bucuresti: Humanitas. 
Detienne, Marcel. 1996. The masters of truth in Archaic Greece; 
translated by Janet Lloyd. New York : Zone Books. 
Diès, August. 1932. Introduction. In Platon. Oeuvres complètes, 
Tome VI. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. 
Guthrie, W. K. C. 1999. Sofiştii [ The Sophists]. Bucuresti: 
Humanitas. 
Hadot, Pierre. 2002. What is ancient philosophy?; translated by 
Michael Chase. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press. 
Hare, R. M. 1996. Plato. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Isocrates. 1969. Exchange. In Selected pages of Greek speakers, 
vol. I. Bucuresti: Publishing House for Literature. 
Liiceanu, Gabriel. 2005. Journal of Păltiniş. Bucharest: 
Humanitas Publishing House. 
Lovejoy, Arthur O. 2001. The Great Chain of Being: A Study of 
the History of an Idea. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: 
Harvard University Press. 
Maci, Mihai. 2006. “Once again Plato. Jan Patočka and the care 
for one’s soul”. In Plato’s political philosophy, ed. Vasile Muscă 
& Alexander Baumgarten. Iasi: Polirom Publishing House. 
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 2001. After Virtue: A study in Moral 
Theory. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Maga, Mihai. 2006. “A logical and political exercise.  Plato’s 
Statesman”. In Plato’s political philosophy, ed. by V. Muscă & 
A. Baumgarten. Iasi: Polirom Publishing House. 
Mureşan, Valentin. 2000. Comentariu la Republica lui Platon [Com-
ment on Plato’s “Republic”]. Bucuresti: Metropol Publishing House. 
 META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (1) / 2009 
  180 
 
Parain, Brice. 1998. Logosul platonician [ Plato’s Logos]. 
Bucuresti: Editura Univers Enciclopedic. 
Plato. 1997. Complete Works. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company. 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich D.E. 2001. Hermeneutica [Hermeneutics]. 
Iasi: Polirom Publishing House. 
Voelke, A.-J. 1973. L’idée de volonté dans le stoïcisme. Paris: 
Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine.  
 
 
Sorin Bocancea is PhD Lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences of 
the “Petre Andrei” University of Iasi. His research interests are the history of 
political thinking, modern and contemporary ideologies, European studies. He 
is author of Institutions and Public Policies in the European Union (2004). 
 
Address: 
Sorin Bocancea 
Department of Political Sciences 
“Petre Andrei” University of Iasi 
Str. Grigore Ghica Voda 13 
700400 Iasi, Romania 
Email: sorinboc@yahoo.com 